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Relativistic financial decisions: Context effects on retirement
saving and investment risk preferences







We report a study of the effects the choice set on financial decision making related to retirement savings and risky
investment. The participants were presented with either a full range of choice options or a limited subset of the feasible
options. The choices of saving and risk are affected by the position of each option in the range of presented options. This
result demonstrated that the range of the options offered as possible saving rates and levels of investment risk influences
decisions about saving and risk. The study was conducted on a sample of working people, and we controlled whether
the participants can financially afford in their real life the decisions taken in the test. In addition, various measures of
risk aversion did not account for the risk taken in each condition. Surprisingly, only the simplest and most direct risk
preference measure was a significant predictor of the responses within a particular choice set context, although the actual
choices were still very much influenced by the range. Thus, the results reported here suggest that financial judgments and
choices are relative, which corroborates, in an important practical domain, previous related work with abstract gambles
and hypothetical risky investments.
Keywords: context effects, decision making, judgment, investment risk, saving.
1 Introduction
This article presents a study that investigated how far sim-
ple, and practically relevant, modifications in the deci-
sion making context can affect how people make finan-
cial decisions related to retirement savings and invest-
ment. Specifically, we aim, using a realistic setting, to
make a suggestive replication of a new and powerful con-
text effect — prospect relativity (Stewart, Chater, Stott,
& Reimers, 2003), in an important practical domain.
In this article, we present a study that investigates the
effects of the framing and presentation of financial infor-
mation when asking people to express their preferences
in relation to different retirement savings and investment
scenarios. The experimental design and method are based
on the recent discovery of a substantial dependence of hu-
man preferences on the set of options they are presented
with. This phenomenon was termed prospect relativity
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and indicates a lack of stable underlying preference func-
tion (Stewart et al., 2003). This finding, which we de-
scribe in more detail below, is striking illustration of the
view that preferences are often constructed, on the fly,
rather being a stable basis for decision making (Slovic,
1995).
A theoretically important question is how far these ef-
fects transfer from abstract low-stakes gambles to major
financial decisions that could significantly affect long-
term well-being. If we observe such transfer to realistic
financial decisions, then this would have practical signif-
icance for marketing, sales, and provision of advice in
the financial services industry. Our goal was to investi-
gate how far individual variation in saving and risk pref-
erences is stable across different realistic decision con-
texts.
1.1 Theoretical background
In search of such realistic psychological foundations for
descriptive decision theory, Stewart et al. (2003) consid-
ered whether context effects observed in psychophysics
might transfer to risky decision making. Specifically,
Stewart et al. found that the set of options, from which an
option was selected, almost completely determined the
choice. They demonstrated this effect in selection of a
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risky prospect and in certainty equivalent estimation task
(the amount of money for certain that is worth the same
to the person as a single chance to play the prospect).
Similarly, the selection of a preferred option from a set of
prospects was strongly influenced by the prospects avail-
able. More recently, Stewart, Chater, and Brown (2006)
developed a model of risky choice, decision by sampling,
which assumes relative judgments and provides one ex-
planation for the results in Stewart et al. (2003).
The cognitive claim that Stewart et al. (2003) advance
is that people are often unable to represent absolute mag-
nitudes, whether psychophysical or abstract (including a
choice option’s attributes like utilities, payoffs, and prob-
abilities). That is, when people represent a magnitude,
they can do so only on the basis of whether it is larger or
smaller than other magnitudes retrieved from memory or
observed in the environment. If people cannot represent
the absolute value of magnitudes on any cardinal scale,
and the subjectively judged utility of an option is de-
termined by its relationship to comparison options, then
judgments will be strongly affected, or even determined,
by the context.
The core evidence for this claim comes from the study
of the perception of the intensity of basic psychophysi-
cal magnitudes such as the brightness of a light or the
loudness of a sound. Much traditional research in psy-
chophysics has assumed the existence of some cardinal
internal scale of intensities, onto which physical stimula-
tion must somehow be mapped; and there has been conse-
quent debate concerning the nature of this mapping (e.g.,
whether it is logarithmic, as argued by Fechner, 1966;
or a power law, as argued by Stevens, 1957). But more
recent theory (reviewed and analysed in Laming, 1997)
suggests a different point of view — that the very idea
of an internal scale is questionable. In particular, Laming
(1997) has shown that empirical data in line with Stevens’
power law (relating psychophysical variables and free nu-
merical judgments) can arise without assuming any rep-
resentation of absolute information. In addition, Stewart,
Brown, and Chater (2005) demonstrated that a wide range
of data from the psychophysical task of absolute magni-
tude identification can be captured by a model which has
no absolute scales, and relies entirely on local compar-
isons between recent stimuli.
A particularly telling example supporting this view-
point is an elegant experiment conducted by Garner
(1954), who asked participants to judge whether tones
were more or less than half as loud as a 90 dB refer-
ence loudness. Participants’ judgments were entirely de-
termined by the range of tones played to them. There
were three groups of participants who received tones
in three different ranges respectively. Participants who
heard tones in the range 55–65 dB had a half-loudness
point (i.e., where their judgments were “more than half as
loud” 50% of the time and “less than half as loud” 50% of
the time), of about 60 dB. Another group, who received
tones in the range 65–75 dB had a half-loudness point of
about 70 dB. A final group, who heard tones in the range
75–85 dB, had a half-loudness point of about 80 dB. Gar-
ner’s experiment indicates, therefore, that people find it
difficult to judge the absolute intensity of the sound (or
what it means for one sound to be half as intense as an-
other). Instead, it seems that people adjust their responses
depending on the presented sound intensities from which
they are asked to choose, which demonstrates that the
context is very overwhelming when it is present.
Other examples of similar context effects abound in
psychophysics (see Stewart et al. 2003; Stewart, Chater,
& Brown, 2006; for a more extensive review of stud-
ies showing that perceptual judgments of stimuli varying
along a single psychological continuum are strongly in-
fluenced by the preceding material), which are consistent
with participants making perceptual judgments on the ba-
sis of relative, rather than absolute magnitude informa-
tion.
Here we have digressed briefly into psychophysics, in
order to make it explicit how we apply the resulting con-
clusion to a decision-making context. Note, though, that
the parallel between the two domains, psychophysics and
economic decision making, is relatively close. After all,
just as perceptual theorists traditionally assumed that peo-
ple have internal scales for the representation of loud-
ness and brightness, so a traditional psychological or eco-
nomic picture of an agent assumes that the agent must
have internal scales for the representation of the utility
and the probability (perhaps distorted as shown by Kah-
neman & Tversky, 1979) of various outcomes. Without
some type of scale for utility or probability, the model
of the economic actor (or any decision-making agent in
general) would look very different.
1.2 Previous results
One prediction based on such model is that the attributes
of the previously or currently seen risky prospects in-
fluence the decisions in the current prospect. Stew-
art et al. (2003) argued for the existence of what they
called prospect relativity: that the perceived value of a
risky prospect (e.g., “p chance of x”) is relative to other
prospects with which it is presented. Note that Stewart
et al. studied peoples’ perception of utilities in individual
decision making tasks in gambling situations. The pre-
diction, based on the psychophysical studies described
above, is that the option set (i.e., the context) will af-
fect peoples’ choices because there is no fixed internal
scale according to which people make their judgements
of the values of certain options. The results demonstrated
a powerful context effect in judging the value of differ-
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ent risky prospects - the set of options offered as poten-
tial certainty equivalents for simple prospects was shown
to have a large effect on the certainty equivalents se-
lected. For example, when during judging the value of
a 50% chance of winning £200 people have options of
£40, £50, £60, and £70, the most popular choice is £60
and then second choice is £50. When people have op-
tions of £90, £100, £110, £120 pounds, the most popular
choice is £100, and then second choice is £110. So the set
of alternatives affected valuation by a factor of (almost)
2. This effect was replicated despite monetary incentives
designed to encourage participants to deliver accurate and
truthful certainty equivalents. In another experiment, the
set from which a simple prospect was selected was also
shown to have a large effect on the prospect that was cho-
sen.
Vlaev and Chater (2006) discovered similar results in
a very different context, where people play the strategic
games based on Prisoner’s Dilemma, indicating the gen-
erality of this effect. In particular, this study showed that
the so-called “cooperativeness” of the previously played
games influence choices and predictions in the current
game, which suggests that games are not considered in-
dependently. These effects involved a perceptual contrast
of the present game with preceding games, depending on
the range and the rank of their cooperativeness.
Finally, Vlaev, Chater, and Stewart (2007) report three
studies, in which methodologies from psychophysics
(which were similar to the methods used by Stewart et
al., 2003) were adapted to investigate context effects on
individual financial decision making under risk. The aim
was to determine how the range and the rank of the op-
tions offered as saving amounts and levels of investment
risk influence people’s decisions about these variables. In
the range manipulation, participants were presented with
either a full range of choice options or a limited subset,
while in the rank manipulation they were presented with
a skewed set of feasible options. The results showed that
choices are affected by the position of each option in the
range and the rank of presented options, which suggests
that judgments and choices are relative.
Effects of the type presented above suggest that peo-
ple’s expressed (or revealed) risk preferences are not
absolute, but are, to some degree at least, relative to
the range of available options (see Stewart, Chater, &
Brown, 2006, for model of risky choice that assumes rel-
ative judgments only). A plausible account of the con-
text effects caused by the range of options is the range-
frequency theory proposed by Parducci (1965, 1995).
Parducci found that the neutral point of the judgment
scale did not correspond to the mean of the contextual
events, contrary to (then popular) adaptation level theory
(Helson, 1964), but rather to a compromise between the
midpoint (defined by the range) and median (depending
on the skew) of the distribution of contextual events. For
example, satisfaction judgements are different between
two distributions of life events, which have different skew
and identical means. The range principle reflects ten-
dency to judge an event relative to its position within the
range of stimuli on the specified dimension of judgment,
while the frequency principle reflects a tendency to judge
an event relative to its rank within the immediate context.
The subjective value given to an attribute is a function of
its position within the overall range of attributes, and its
rank. Thus, this model implies that attributes are judged
purely in relation to one another and their subjective value
is independent of their absolute value. Range-frequency
theory has already been used to account for context ef-
fects in decision making under risk. Birnbaum (1992),
Stewart et al. (2003), Vlaev and Chater (2006), and Vlaev,
Chater, and Stewart (2007) found their data to be consis-
tent with the theory.
Similar effects in a more practical domain were shown
by Benartzi and Thaler (2002) who offered the respon-
dents a choice between retirement investment options
with varying ranges of expected future income (e.g.,
chose between $900 monthly pension for sure and a 50/50
chance to get either $1,100 per month or $800 per month
after retirement). When the range of investment pro-
grams comprised three options varying from low risk to
high risk, the investors selected the middle options sig-
nificantly more often irrespectively of their absolute risk
level (e.g., the same option was judged as the least attrac-
tive one when positioned at the top of the range, but also
perceived as the most attractive one when in the middle
of the range).
Note that these relativistic patterns may also reflect a
more general tendency to prefer central options that is
seen when choosing amongst identical options (e.g., if
people cannot differentiate between the presented options
due to ignorance, indifference, etc.), which may be an ex-
ample of the compromise effect (also called extremeness
aversion; see Simonson & Tversky, 1992). Indeed in the
compromise effect (e.g., Simonson, 1989), an option that
represents a compromise between two alternatives may
be preferred over the alternatives, even though the alter-
natives are preferred over this option in a pairwise binary
choice.
In this article, we present a suggestive extension of
our previous work (Stewart et al. 2003; Vlaev & Chater,
2006; Vlaev, Chater, & Stewart, 2007) to an important
practical domain (similarly to Benartzi & Thaler, 2002).
In particular, we aimed to replicate the prospect relativ-
ity principle to more realistic financial decision making
scenarios. The results we present here suggest that, when
people make financial decisions, the attractiveness of the
choice options significantly depends on the other avail-
able options.
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Table 1: Figures for saved amount (£), investment risk
(%), and retirement age in the three conditions of the ex-
periment.
Free Choice Low Range High Range
Save Risk Retire Save Risk Retire Save Risk Retire
500 0 48 500 0 48
1,000 10 50 1,000 10 50
1,500 20 52 1,500 20 52
2,000 30 54 2,000 30 54
2,500 40 56 2,500 40 56
3,000 50 58 3,000 50 58 3,000 50 58
3,500 60 60 3,500 60 60
4,000 70 62 4,000 70 62
4,500 80 64 4,500 80 64
5,000 90 66 5,000 90 66
5,500 100 68 5,500 100 68
2 Experiment
2.1 Prospect relativity principle and realis-
tic financial decision scenarios
Thus the main goal of this experimental study was to
make a provisional estimate of the degree to which the
kinds of effects that are revealed by Stewart et al. (2003)
could also be applicable to real financial decisions. Our
study builds on, and is similar to, the study by Vlaev,
Chater, and Stewart (2007). The domain used here, and
also by Vlaev, Chater, and Stewart, was saving and in-
vestment for retirement, because it is an issue having
serious social relevance at the moment. We currently
live in a financial environment in which aging popula-
tion and younger consumers are increasingly expected to
take command of their own pension and investment deci-
sions. Therefore, the following two key issues arise: How
does the range of options people choose between affect
the level of pension investment they choose? How does
the range of options from which people choose affect the
level of risk they accept with that investment?
This experiment followed logic similar to the deci-
sion experiments reported by Stewart et al. (2003) and
Vlaev, Chater, and Stewart (2007), which were in turn in-
spired by Garner’s (1954) loudness judgment experiment.
In various questions, the participants in our study were
asked to select among a predefined set of values related
to five variables: (a) the desired percentage of the annual
income that will be saved for retirement, (b) the invest-
ment risk expressed as the percentage of the saving that
will be invested in risky assets, (c) retirement age, (d) ex-
pected retirement income, and (e) possible variability of
the retirement income.
There was a control condition, in which the partici-
pants had to freely decide the value of each one of these
variables selecting from the full range of options. In two
context conditions, participants were asked to select these
values from sub-ranges of the set of options offered by
the experimenter in the full range condition. Thus, there
were three between-participant conditions in the experi-
ment presented here, i.e., with separate groups for the full
range, low range, and high range conditions. In the full
range condition, all options were presented. In the two
other conditions, the choice of prospects was limited to
either the first or second half of the prospects available
in the free choice condition, so that the participant in the
high range condition were presented with a range of val-
ues the lowest of which coincides with the highest option
in the low context condition.
In the full range condition for saving, the options were
presented in monetary terms and varied from £500 to
£5,500 increasing with £500 between the options; so
there were eleven options to choose among, while the
low range condition spanned from £500 to £3,000 and
the high range condition was from £3,000 to £5,500. The
same design was applied for the risk variable. The choice
option values in the full range condition for investment
risk varied from 0% to 100% and were increasing with
10% between the options. For retirement age the values
varied from 48 to 68 increasing with 2 years. Table 1
presents the values for savings, risk, and retirement age,
in the three conditions. For the retirement income and its
variability, the values were different for every question
depending on the combination of saved amount, invest-
ment risk, and retirement age.
Note that, for risk, it is natural to assume that people
anchor the possible percentage of their retirement savings
that can be invested in risky assets to be between on 0%
and 100% (i.e., people cannot have negative savings, or
invest more than 100% of their savings because the use
of leverage, like borrowing for example, in retirement ac-
counts is restricted by regulation). For the range of pos-
sible savings values, it is equally easy to imagine that the
lower bound is zero, while the upper bound depends on
many factors such as, for example, legal requirements,
cost of living, etc. We fixed the maximum possible sav-
ings range across all conditions at £5,500, which is 22%
of the average salary in UK at the time (£25,000), be-
cause 22% approximates the upper bound for the retire-
ment savings rate in UK due to legal and tax restrictions.
The team of professional actuaries who monitored our re-
search project suggested 22% as the practically relevant
upper bound.
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Figure 1: Predictions in terms of cumulative frequencies
of choices, which would be expected, if people have (a)
fixed, and (b) relative, level of risk aversion.
2.2 Hypotheses
Our prediction was that, if a participant is not influenced
by the set of options, then his or her choice of each value
in the high and low range conditions should be indepen-
dent of the other values in the set and the chosen values
should be the nearest to his or her free choice. It is helpful
to consider the predictions (represented in terms of cu-
mulative frequencies of choices), that would be expected
if people have a fixed and absolute level of preference
for saving, (or any other preferences), which they use to
make their choices. If we suppose that, where the full set
of choices is available, people make each choice roughly
equally, then, the cumulative frequency is an increasing
linear function of saving rate, shown as a straight line
in the upper part of Figure 1a. If the choice set is re-
stricted to the lower saving options only, then all the par-
ticipants who would, in the full context condition, have
chosen one of the higher saving options, were they still
available, should instead choose the highest available op-
tion. The choices of all other participants should be un-
changed. (This follows on the assumption that people
choose according to a fixed absolute saving/consumption
preference, and hence the availability of non-preferred
options should not affect their choices). Thus, the cu-
mulative frequency function should, in the lower saving
condition, follow the linear function of the full condition
and all remaining participants should choose the highest
available option, so that this point goes directly to 1. Sim-
ilarly, in the case where only the upper range of options is
available, the cumulative frequency is clearly at 0 for all
the non-available options. If people’s judgments are ab-
solute, then participants who would otherwise have cho-
sen the low saving options that are now not available will
choose the lowest of the available high options. Specif-
ically, the cumulative frequency should jump directly to
the linear function level appropriate in the full range con-
dition and, as other choices in the high range should be
unaffected by the presence or absence of non-preferred
lower options, the function should then follow the linear
function of the full context condition thereafter.
By contrast, the lower part of Figure 1b shows the pre-
dictions from the extreme opposite assumption: instead
of people choosing saving levels on the basis of fixed,
absolute saving (consumption) preferences, they assess
saving purely in relative terms. If this is correct, then
the pattern of response should have the same distribution,
whether the responses are distributed across the full con-
text, or just the lower and upper context. So, if we as-
sume that response is even in the full context condition
(and hence that the cumulative probability function is lin-
ear), then in the lower and upper contexts, the cumulative
distribution should also be linear, but compressed over a
smaller number of choice options (i.e., with an increased
slope).
We also conducted the following statistical comparison
between the high range and low range conditions in order
to test furthermore whether the context (range of options)
had a significant effect on the choices. We compared the
lowest option in the high range, against the sum of all the
items in the low range, except the highest item (i.e., every
option in the low range, which was missing in the high
range). In other words, we compared whether the low-
est option in the high range condition was significantly
lower than the proportion of times the options below it
were selected in the low range condition. Conversely, we
compared the highest option in the low range, against the
sum of the options in the high range, except the lowest op-
tion. In either direction (and we tested both directions),
if the latter is bigger, we have a prospect relativity effect
(or at least, a rational choice model will fail to predict
this result) and we can conclude that this result should
be due to the effects of the choice set in the high range
and low range condition respectively. The logic behind
this analysis is that people who do not select the highest
item in the low range condition should definitely select
the lowest item in the high range condition. So the for-
mer ought to be less numerous than the latter. This is be-
cause their true preferences should be within the options
lower than the highest item in the low range condition. In
other words, the reason we are missing the highest item
in the low/high range, is that we do not know what pro-
portion of the people selecting this option want to select
options above/below it, but they do not have the opportu-
nity in the low/high range. Alternatively, if participants’
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responses are solely determined by the set of options pre-
sented to them, then the distribution of responses across




We sent the materials (the financial affordability ques-
tionnaire and the savings and investment questionnaire)
by post to a population of working individuals, as this
population is typically not able to attend laboratory ses-
sions. We sent out the questionnaire to 600 people, and
received 64 completed questionnaires. These respondents
were typical of the demographics in the geographical area
and selected from a big subject pool of people who ex-
pressed desire to participate. Participants who completed
their questionnaires were paid £10 for their participation
(received as a check after they have returned the answer
sheet). There were 24 men with mean age 36.5 and 40
women with mean age 37. The Low Range Condition
had 20 participants: 7 men (mean age 37) and 13 women
(mean age 38); the Free Choice Condition had 21 partic-
ipants: 9 men (mean age 33) and 12 women (mean age
36); and the High Range Condition had 23 participants:
8 men (mean age 40) and 15 women (mean age 36).
2.3.2 Design
The experimental design had two main elements. One
was the specific financial design of the prospect relativity
test and the second was the design of the realistic practical
setting that aimed to improve the real-world validity of
the test.
Prospect relativity test: The questions in the prospect
relativity test were formulated as long-term sav-
ing/investment decision tasks related to retirement in-
come provision. The participants had to make decisions
about five key variables. These variables were the saved
proportion of the current income, the risk of the invest-
ment expressed as the proportion invested in risky assets1,
the retirement age, the desired income after retirement,
and the preferred variability of this income (we explained
that such variability is due to favourable and respectively
unfavourable economics conditions).
1There are, of course, various types of risky assets, including a wide
variety of bonds and equities; but in reality these various investment
vehicles differ mainly in their risk-return characteristics. Therefore, we
simply described the characteristics of these two assets — the High Risk
Asset and the Low Risk Asset, rather than labelling them explicitly as
bonds and equities, although while setting the basis so that it is not out
of line with typical assumptions made about actual assets. This aimed to
avoid some of the potential challenges that might otherwise result and
which could draw attention away from the results.
Table 2: A question in the free choice condition, in which
the participants were asked to choose their preferred level
of investment risk by selecting one of the rows in the ta-
ble below. In this format the key variable is in the first
column of the table, while the other columns are showing
the effects on the other three variables (minimum, aver-
age, and maximum retirement income).
Now assume that you decided to retire at 65 and to
save £3000 per year in order to provide for your re-
tirement income. The following options offer different
ranges of retirement income depending on the percent-
age of your savings invested in the High Risk asset,
and you can see in the table the effects on the expected
average retirement income and its variability (mini-
mum and maximum). There is such variability of your
expected retirement income because when you invest
in the High Risk asset your income partially depends
on the performance of the market and the economy in
general, which might vary over time. Note that the pre-
cise amount of your pension is unpredictable, because
of possible variation in investment performance, but it
is very likely (more than 95% chance) that it will be
between (i.e., cannot get below and above) the mini-
mum and the maximum values indicated in the table
below. For instance, if you invest 50% per year in the
High Risk asset (see the table below), then it is very
likely (95 percent chance) that your annual retirement
income will be more than £3,250 and less than £5,000,
and on average (50 percent chance) you can get more
than £4,500. Now please select how much to invest in





0 % 3,500 3,500 4,000
10 % 3,450 3,700 4,200
20 % 3,400 3,900 4,400
30 % 3,350 4,100 4,600
40 % 3,300 4,300 4,800
50 % 3,250 4,500 5,000
60 % 3,200 4,700 5,200
70 % 3,150 4,900 5,500
80 % 3,100 5,000 5,800
90 % 3,050 5,100 6,100
100 % 3,000 5,200 6,500
The experimental materials were designed as 10 inde-
pendent hypothetical questions, in which we varied each
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of the five key variables. However five of the questions
focused only on savings while the other five questions
focused only on risk, and some questions showed how
changing savings or risk would affect another variable or
set of variables. For example, how changing the invest-
ment risk can affect the projected retirement income and
its variability — with higher risk offering higher expected
income on average, but also wider spread of the possible
values.2 As an example, Table 2 presents a question in
the free choice condition, in which the participants were
asked to choose their preferred level of investment risk
by selecting one of the rows in the table (note that in this
format the key choice variable is in the first column of the
table while the other columns are showing the effects on
the other variables like the minimum, average, and maxi-
mum retirement income3).
The future distribution (risk) of the investment in risky
assets is calculated as follows. Assuming a variable an-
nual interest rate with mean µ and standard deviation σ,
the expected return on an n-year investment is log nor-
mally distributed with mean µn and standard deviation
σ = µ2n(((σ2/µ2) + 1)n+1). We also assumed that an
annuity that provides 1/14th of the lump sum saved each
year is purchased, which is a typical figure used in the
UK financial services industry. We created test materi-
als for three different age groups, namely, 30, 40, and 50.
We sent the identical test materials to respondents who
are plus or minus 5 years around each age group (e.g.,
the financial options calculated for somebody who is 30,
were also sent to all respondents between 25 and 35 yrs
old). Thus the projected retirement income was calcu-
lated for three time horizons: after 35, 25, and 15 years
2In order to derive plausible figures for the various economic vari-
ables we implemented a simple econometric model into a spreadsheets
Monte Carlo simulator that calculates the likely impact of changes in
each variable on the other four variables. For example, this model can
derive what retirement income can be expected from certain savings,
investment risk, and retirement age, or what are the possible potential
investment options that could lead to the preferred retirement income.
The sort of basis the professional actuaries suggested was 2.5% for In-
flation, 1.5% real return on Low Risk asset, 4.5% real return on High
Risk asset, and 15% annual volatility. Note also that all figures are in
pounds and the participants knew this. It is important to stress that all
figures shown were in today’s money terms (i.e. after taking out the
effects of inflation). This is important when comparing figures for dif-
ferent retirement ages.
3Most of the questions showed the expected retirement income and
its variability like in the example above. The possible variability of
the retirement income was explained by referring to the 95% and re-
spectively 5% confidence intervals of the income variability, i.e., max-
imum and minimum possible values of the income, for which there is
5% chance to be more than the higher or less than the lower value re-
spectively. On each row of the table these two values were placed on
the both sides of the average expected retirement income. The con-
fidence intervals were expressed also in verbal terms using the words
very likely. For example, the participants were informed that it is very
likely (95% chance) that their income will be below the higher value
and above the lower value, and that these two values change depending
on the proportion of the investment in equities.
of investment respectively.
Here is a detailed description of each question and its
purpose (the questions are grouped by the key variable
that participants are asked to select — savings or invest-
ment risk). Appendix A presents all questions in an ex-
ample questionnaire designed for a person who is around
40 years old.
Saving questions There were five questions
asking people to choose between savings op-
tions presented in monetary terms.
1. Choose how much to save without infor-
mation about other variables.
2. Choose how much to save and see ex-
pected retirement income.
3. Choose how much to save and trade it off
with retiring at different age and see the
expected retirement income.
4. Choose how much to save and see the
retirement income and its minimum and
maximum variability happening because
assume that 50% of the savings are in-
vested in the High Risk asset.
5. Choose how much to save and take dif-
ferent levels of risk starting from low sav-
ings and investment risk and then increase
both in parallel.
Risk questions. Next are the five questions
asking people to choose levels of risk formu-
lated as percentage of saving invested in the
High Risk asset:
1. Choose how much to invest without infor-
mation about other variables.
2. Choose how much to invest and see ex-
pected retirement income and its variabil-
ity.
3. Choose how much to invest and trade-off
it with retiring at different age and see the
expected retirement income and its vari-
ability.
4. Choose how much to invest and trade-
off it with amount to be saved (increas-
ing investment corresponding to decreas-
ing savings) and see the retirement in-
come and its variability.
5. Choose between levels of variability of
the retirement income. Variability reflects
different investment strategies and is in-
creasing with the income (higher variabil-
ity corresponds to higher income).
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The ten questions were presented in different order in
the various conditions. We also counterbalanced the or-
der of saving and risk questions by dividing the partici-
pants into two groups: one that first answered the saving
questions and then the risk questions, and a second group
that answered the risk questions before the saving ones.
The high range condition was derived by deleting the
lower five rows of the table for each question in the full
range condition and the low range condition was derived
by deleting the higher five rows in the tables in the full
range condition (i.e., the same was done for each ques-
tion). Therefore, in the full range condition, the partic-
ipants had to choose among eleven possible answer op-
tions for each questions, although in the high and low
range conditions there were only six available answer
options. Note that in this design the participant had to
choose among predetermined option values in all con-
ditions. This design was similar to the design used in
Experiment 4 reported by Stewart et al., (2003), where
in the full range condition the participants had to choose
among predefined set of risky prospects (gambles), al-
though in the two context conditions they were asked to
choose among predetermined choice options that were ei-
ther the higher half or the lower half of the list of options
offered in the full range condition. Vlaev, Chater, and
Stewart (2007) also used very similar design.
Realistic practical setting: In addition, the design of
the experiment presented in this article had four new fea-
tures relative to the work reported by Vlaev, Chater, and
Stewart (2007). We designed these new characteristics
in order to increase our study’s relevance to real-world
financial advice. These four new design features were:
1. Representative sample. The study was conducted on
a sample of working people, rather than university stu-
dents. In other words, we used participants who were
more likely to be consumers of financial advice (e.g., peo-
ple who were already working, had a family, and needed
to save for retirement pension provision) than the student
population used in Vlaev, Chater, and Stewart (2007).
2. Realistic financial assumptions. The future financial
outcomes (e.g., expected annuity values) were calculated
using very plausible financial assumptions (like inflation,
risk free rate, risk premium rate, etc.). We undertook
this work on consumer understanding of risk, both from a
mathematical and from a psychological standpoint, with
the help of the Actuarial Profession’s Personal Financial
Planning Committee in United Kingdom (who actively
participated in creating the test materials and the descrip-
tions of the risky assets). The age of the participants was
also taken into account in calculating the time horizon of
future returns.
3. Financial affordability questionnaire. In the light
of the important discussion raised at our meetings with
professional actuaries and personal financial advisers, we
took account of financial affordability, as a constraint on
people’s choice of pension. We created a financial afford-
ability test, which categorised people according to their
individual financial circumstances. The financial afford-
ability test was designed to help and encourage the par-
ticipants to think through the practical viability of the fi-
nancial options that they choose. An additional purpose
of the financial affordability test was to make the exper-
imental situation appear as a very realistic example of a
financial advisory process. This was achieved by asking
the participants concrete questions about their real life fi-
nancial circumstances and problems. Thus, by explicitly
focusing respondents’ attention on their real life struggles
at the beginning of the experimental session, we expected
them to provide more adequate and valid responses to our
saving and investment questions.
The financial affordability questionnaire is presented
in Appendix B and it had the following main features:
a) Question 2 asked people to estimate to what extent
their current income (question 1) was sufficient to cover
their expenditures, and then to judge in percentage term
whether, and by how much, this income was sufficient
or insufficient to cover these expenses (e.g., “I would be
happy to earn around 20% more than my current salary”).
In addition, the participants were asked to indicate how
much they are able to save at the moment (question 3).
b) In question 4, the participants were provided with a list
of various types of spending and they had to answer how
much of their current income is spend on each of these
expenditures. In general, there were two types of expen-
diture examples — discretionary (e.g., leisure activities)
and essential ones (e.g., food and rent) and we asked the
respondents to give estimates of their expenditure across
these categories.
c) Question 6 asked people whether they could give up
some of their discretionary spending in order to increase
their savings. Here the focus again was on the amount and
type of current saving and discretionary spending; and
hence the degree to which people could readily reallocate
money towards a pension. Here we also aimed to test
how important and essential some of these discretionary
expenditures are (e.g., some people might be unwilling to
give up some types of social life, hobbies, sport activities,
etc.). Participants were also informed that, at the end of
the experimental session, if their average preferred sav-
ings rate was above their current savings as indicated in
question 3, then they had to readjust some of their expen-
ditures in question 4 so that to be able to provide the addi-
tional capital, that is the lacking difference between their
real savings and the saving levels selected in the second
part of the experiment (in addition, question 5 separately
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asked what is the maximum amount that they would con-
sider saving each year).
Appendix C presents the results from the Financial Af-
fordability Questionnaire, which indicates that all respon-
dents took their task seriously and carefully selected the
saving options in the main test so that their choices re-
flected their real financial circumstances (these results are
not discussed here in detail, because the purpose of this
questionnaire was mainly to prompt the respondents to
give realistic answers to the prospect relativity test).
4. Risk preference tests. We collected information
about participants’ risk attitudes in order to investigate
the extent to which their decisions correlated with their
self-reported risk attitudes. Thus, we expected to test
whether people can be manipulated to take more risk than
their explicit (conscious) risk attitudes would permit, or
whether they intuitively know how much investment risk
to take. Such results could also inform us whether it is
worth trying to stimulate people to invest in a way that
best matches their risk and time preferences (for example,
to increase their investment risk exposure if they are par-
ticularly risk seeking), or, if people’s decisions are easily
manipulated by the context, whether to offer them finan-
cial products only on the bases of their individual goals
and social and financial circumstances (e.g., to offer them
relatively risky investments that will accomplish the de-
sired retirement income, independently of their risk pref-
erences). We used five different measures of risk aversion
(presented in Appendix D) in order to measure whether
the choices of investment risk in the high and low range
conditions are due to natural risk preferences instead of
context effects. These measures represented typical self-
report hypothetical measures (as used in the literature) in
the form of simple direct questions and hypothetical gam-
bles
a) Questions 1–4 (Direct Risk, Direct Concern, Relative
Risk, Relative Concern). These questions are rather sim-
ple and direct measures. We used these both as a base-
line, and also because of existing results showing that
simple self-report measures of risk preferences could be
more powerful predictors of portfolio allocation than so-
phisticated measures based on economic theory (Kapteyn
& Teppa, 2002). Two of these questions measured risk at-
titudes with the basic questions “How much risk are you
prepared to take?” (Direct Risk) or “How much are you
concerned about your financial future?” (Direct Concern)
and the participants had to answer on a scale from 1 (not
at all) to 5 (very much) to what extent they agree with
these statements. There were also two questions about
how people perceive their level of risk aversion in rela-
tion to other people – “Are you more or less willing to
take risks than the average person?” (Relative Risk) or
“Are you more or less concerned about your financial fu-
ture than the average person?” (Relative Concern) and
the participants had to answer on the following scale: 1,
much less; 2, less; 3, the same as the average; 4, more;
and 5, much more.
b) Question 5 (Income Gamble). Question 5 is a well-
known test by Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro
(1997), which measures risk aversion by asking people
to chose between gambles representing lifetime incomes.
This approach is different from standard tests in the liter-
ature, which usually ask people to gamble over spending
or consumption and offer relatively small amounts that
have no significant effect on total wealth. Such stakes
are too small to be meaningfully related to consump-
tion and should not require a risk premium (on norma-
tive grounds), and therefore such gambles are not a good
measure of economic risk preference. So a proper mea-
sure of risk aversion according to Barsky et al. should ask
people to decide about gambles over lifetime income. In
addition, after pre-testing, Barsky et al. concluded that
people would find income lotteries easier to understand
than consumption lotteries. The three questions in this
test, in the first paragraph of Question 5 (Appendix D)
and then in (a) and (b), group the respondents into four
“risk preference categories,” which is done on the basis
of the combinations of their answers: (1) reject the risk
to cut (family) income by one-third in the first paragraph
and also reject the risk in (b) to cut income by one-fifth
(20%); (2) reject the risk of a one-third income cut in
the first paragraph but accept the possibility for one-fifth
cut in (b); (3) accept the possibility for one-third income
cut in the first paragraph but reject the one-half cut risk
in (a); and (4) accept both the one-third income cut in
the first question and the one-half cut in (a). These four
categories rank the respondents according to their level
of risk-seeking without assuming any functional form for
their underlying utility function. Barsky et al. provide
four numerical indices of relative increasing risk-seeking
corresponding to each category respectively: 0.11, 0.36,
0.68, and 1.61. In the original study by Barsky et al., their
measure was significantly correlated with various demo-
graphic factors, and it was positively related to risky be-
haviors such as smoking, drinking, being uninsured, and
investing in company stocks vs. treasury bills.
2.3.3 Procedure
Participants were sent a booklet containing the finan-
cial affordability questionnaire, the ten saving and risk
questions, and the five questions measuring risk aversion.
They received written instruction explaining that the pur-
pose of the experiment was to answer questions about
savings and investment related to retirement income pro-
vision, that there were no right and wrong answers, and
that they were free to choose whatever most suited their
preferences. It was explained that the choice options were
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predetermined because these were the outcomes that can
be realistically accomplished according to a standard eco-
nomic model and that the task was to choose the option
that was nearest to the their preferences. The participants
were also informed that if they found them unsatisfactory
then they could indicate values outside these ranges.
The questions and the answer options were presented
as in the example question in Table 2, which shows the
projected retirement income for the 40 years old age
group (i.e., after 25 years of investment). The partici-
pants chose one of the values in the first column of the
table (which were either savings or investment risk val-
ues) and they were provided with a separate answer sheet
on which to write their answers. Participants were in-
formed that their answers did not need to be consistent
between the questions, and that they could freely change
their preferences on each question and choose different
savings and risk values.
Another issue that we had to deal with was how to ac-
count for people’s existing savings because we wanted
to make our session as realistic as possible. If we gave
our questions to somebody who already had a good pen-
sion scheme, then she might have chosen very low sav-
ing amounts and investment risk just because she did not
need to save much more. On the other side, if we told
her to imagine that our scheme was offering her to start
anew, then our calculation would have had to include also
their accumulated savings up to date. This would have re-
quired some sophisticated software to be used online with
every individual (and which is probably used by the real
financial advisors). Our solution to this problem was to
write in the instructions that most people in UK are under-
provided and that we were studying what kind of pension
top-up product people might find attractive (in addition
to the social security scheme), and therefore this was an
extra to what they already had.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Prospect relativity test
Note that, although the questions related to saving and
risk asked the participants to trade-off different variables
(e.g., savings versus retirement income in one question,
and savings versus risk in another question), we used
the weighted average of the answers of each participant
across all five questions related to saving and all five
questions related to risk, in order to derive the mean val-
ues for saving and risk in each condition; and these av-
eraged results are discussed here. This was done be-
cause the results showed qualitatively the same pattern
and there were no significant differences across the five
questions for saving and risk respectively.
The cumulative proportion of times each saving option
Figure 2: Cumulative proportion of times each saving
option was chosen in the low range, full range and high
range conditions.
Figure 3: Cumulative proportion of times each invest-
ment risk option was chosen in the low range, full range,
and high range conditions.
(percentage) was chosen in the low context, full context,
and high context conditions is plotted in Figure 2. The
results were averaged over all participants. The pattern
of responses shown in Figure 2 is very similar to the co-
linear pattern presented in Figure 1b indicating purely rel-
ative preferences, and is markedly dissimilar to Figure 1a
showing fixed and absolute preferences.
The cumulative proportion of times each investment
risk option was chosen in the full context, low context,
and high context conditions is plotted in Figure 3. Here
again the pattern of responses (shown in Figure 4) is sim-
ilar to the co-linear pattern presented in Figure 1b indi-
cating relative preferences. However, the distribution of
responses in all conditions is skewed towards the lower
options, suggesting that overall people are risk averse and
prefer lower levels of investment risk.
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Now we consider the direct statistical test of whether
these data are compatible with stable absolute prefer-
ences, by comparing the restricted (high and low range)
conditions (using the logic outlined earlier). The propor-
tion of times the lowest saving option in the high range
condition (the £3,000 option) was selected was .42 and
was significantly lower than .77, which is the propor-
tion of times the options below it were selected in the
low range condition, t(38) = 3.34, p = .0019. This re-
sult indicates that the context has affected choices in the
high range condition. The proportion of times the high-
est option in the low range condition (again the £3,000
option) was selected was .20, and this value was signif-
icantly lower than 0.58, which was the sum of the op-
tions in the high range condition, except the lowest op-
tion, t(38) = 3.60, p = .0009. This result also means that
the hypothesis that participants’ choices were unaffected
by context should be rejected; the pattern of prospect rel-
ativity (Stewart et al., 2003) is evident.
Turning to the comparison of the high and low range
conditions for risk, the proportion of times the lowest op-
tion in the high range condition (the 50% option) was se-
lected was .58, which was significantly lower than the
proportion of times the options below it were selected in
the low range condition, .85, t(38) = 3.11, p = .0035. The
proportion of times the highest option in the low range
condition (again the 50% option) was selected was .11,
which was significantly lower than .41, the sum of the
options in the high range condition, except the lowest op-
tion, t(38) = 3.60, p = .0009. Again, the results are in-
compatible with the assumption that people have stable
absolute preferences among the choices options, which is
a further illustration of prospect relativity.
In summary, the results for saving and risk clearly
demonstrate that the choices were strongly influenced by
the set of offered choice options.4 Thus, we replicated our
previous findings (Vlaev, Chater, & Stewart, 2007) with
realistic financial assumptions and population that does
need to make this kind of decisions in real-life. Thus, we
have demonstrated that prospect relativity can be repli-
cated even when people are faced with familiar situations
(like saving, consumption, pension plans, and investment
in the capital markets), with which they are likely to have
some exposure and practice (at least the media provides
enough information on the last issue). Note, however,
that even though the choices were significantly affected
by the context in the high range condition, the skewed
4Additional analysis also established that the context effects are rel-
atively similar for people from different income ranges. In other words,
people who can least afford it are not more or less likely to be influ-
enced by the range of options offered to them. We also did not find any
gender differences in terms of saving and investment risk preferences,
and context malleability on these two dimensions (i.e., women were not
more context sensitive than men). All these analyses are not reported
here, but these additional results are available on request.
Table 3: Mean risk levels chosen for each risk preference
measure and for Investment Risk in each condition. In-
vestment Risk is calculated as the mean proportion (%)
of the savings invested in the Risky Asset. p is the signif-
icance value of the F test in the ANOVA testing the hy-
pothesis that average scores are equal across conditions.
(Standard deviations in parentheses.)
Condition
Low Full High ANOVA
Risk measure range range range p
Direct Risk 2.40 2.47 2.20 .5864
(1.14) (0.70) (0.62)
Direct Concern 3.30 3.47 3.15 .6863
(1.38) (1.12) (0.93)
Relative Risk 2.65 2.75 2.47 .6126
(0.93) (0.91) (0.77)
Relative Concern 2.85 3.05 2.84 .7270
(1.04) (0.83) (0.90)
Income Gamble 0.70 0.67 0.53 .5921
(0.62) (0.53) (0.50)
results in this condition clearly show that there is a ten-
dency towards certain most preferred values for savings
and risk. This result suggests that people’s preferences
are not completely malleable by the context.
2.4.2 Risk Preferences
Table 3 presents the results from the five questions
measuring respondents’ risk preferences. All five risk-
aversion measures indicate that the respondents typically
perceived themselves to be moderately risk averse. Note
that risk-averse preferences are implied by values that
are: a) lower than 3.0 for Direct Risk; b) higher than 3.0
for Direct Concern; c) lower than 3.0 for Relative Risk;
d) higher than 3.0 for Relative Concern; and e) lower
than 0.69 for the Income Gamble, which is the mean be-
tween the four indices of relative risk-seeking. The av-
erage scores for the five risk preference tests were very
similar. The significance value of the F test in the Analy-
sis of Variance (ANOVA) test shown in Table 3 indicates
that the average scores were not significantly different be-
tween the three conditions (there was a main effect of
the factor Condition) for all five tests. In summary, these
results demonstrate that the self-reported subjective risk
preferences did not change as the context changed.
However, a rather interesting result in presented in Ta-
ble 4, which shows the correlations between the risk pref-
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Table 4: Spearman’s rho correlations between the investment risk and the five risk aversion measures in the three
conditions of the experiment. Investment Risk is calculated as the mean proportion (%) of the savings invested in the
Risky Asset.
Investment Direct Direct Relative Relative
Risk Risk Concern Risk Concern
Low Range (N = 20)
Direct Risk .64** —
Direct Concern .38 .27 —
Relative Risk .17 .29 -.10 —
Relative Concern -.02 -.02 .39 -.37 —
Income Gamble .34 .16 .08 .64** -.39
Full Range (N = 20)
Direct Risk .68** —
Direct Concern .29 .33 —
Relative Risk .48* .75** .08 —
Relative Concern .40 .32 .58** .38 —
Income Gamble .10 .39 -.13 .43 -.10
High Range (N = 20)
Direct Risk .50* —
Direct Concern .07 .08 —
Relative Risk .37 .60** .19 —
Relative Concern .25 .17 .75** -.12 —
Income Gamble .00 -.09 -.41 -.44 -.11
* p < .05 (2-tailed); ** p < .01 (2-tailed) .
erence measures and the investment risk in each condi-
tion. We used the Spearman’s correlation coefficient be-
cause some of the measures were quantitative variables
(the Investment Risk and the Income Gamble) and some
were variables with ordered categories (the questions 1–
4). Table 3 shows that in the Low Range condition, there
was a strong correlation between the Direct Risk mea-
sure and Investment Risk, r = .64, p = .0022. In the Full
Range condition, the Investment Risk correlated signif-
icantly again with Direct Risk, r = .68, p = .0015, but
also with Relative Risk, r = .48, p = .0345. In the High
Range condition, the Investment Risk correlated signifi-
cantly only with Direct Risk, r = .50, p = .0264.
In summary, only Direct Risk was significantly as-
sociated with risky choice in all three conditions. In
other words, within each context, people who selected
the options with higher risk also indicated that they were
more risk seeking, and vice versa. This result suggests
that while people’s choices are dependent on the context,
their subjective risk-aversion is a stable trait. The predic-
tive power of the simple question measuring Direct Risk
could be explained if we assume that people are more or
less aware about their risk preferences, but their risk per-
ception is determined by the context. The fact that only
the simplest Direct Risk measure was a significant pre-
dictor, suggests that people use some very crude heuris-
tics (e.g., “How much risk I am prepared to take?”) to
select choice options, which are perceived as relatively
safe or risky only in comparison to the other available
options (i.e., in the current context). Thus, the significant
predictive power of the Direct Risk measure implies that
people define their preferences in relation to the available
set of choice options, which again corroborates our claim
that judgments are made relative to the available refer-
ence points in the current environment. Note also that the
Relative Risk measure also correlated significantly with
risky choice in the full range condition (which is the most
sensitive condition as the participants had a biggest range
of choices). Therefore, a definite conclusion that only one
measure is useful might be premature at this stage.
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One implications of this result is that directly asking
people about their risk preferences may be as useful as
apparently more sophisticated risk-diagnostics in helping
people to choose financial products. Moreover, our re-
sults concerning prospect relativity, and the literature on
framing effects more generally, suggest that attempting
to associate individuals with an “economic” risk pref-
erence (e.g., the curvature of the utility or value func-
tions) is likely to be ineffective, because results will de-
pend substantially on the framing of the question, rather
than reflecting an underlying attribute of the consumer.
Nonetheless, simple direct risk measures may still be
used to help in the design of the financial products of-
fered by financial advisers, by making the range of of-
fered investment options to vary depending on the risk
profile of the consumer. For example, in order to prevent
a risk-averse client to make an investment which is too
risky for him/her, one could offer a relatively safe range
of investment options, and thus utilise the powerful effect
of the context in order to accomplish a better match with
individual risk preferences.
3 General discussion and conclu-
sions
Our results demonstrate that, when people make financial
decisions the attractiveness of the choice options signifi-
cantly depends on the other available options. In partic-
ular, the set of options offered as potential savings and
risk options was shown to have a large effect on the se-
lected options. In general, the context provided by items
that are considered simultaneously does affect decisions
about saving and investment risk. These results could
be considered as suggestive replication of the prospect
relativity principle, which is implies that risky financial
prospects are judged relative to accompanying prospects.
These findings suggest that investors have ill-formed
preferences about their financial investments, which is
consistent with Stewart et al.’s (2003) claims. Part of
the problem may be that investors are approximately in-
different among many of the options. Such indifference
would increase the influence of context, yet do little harm
in terms of leading people to make choices that were in-
consistent with their utilities and risk attitudes. Our re-
sults do not speak to the question of how much expected
utility would be lost as a result of a strong context effect.
We also tested whether people naturally tend to make
decisions matching their subjective risk attitudes and
whether they can be manipulated to pass this level by
manipulating the context (which in reality might be nec-
essary in order to accomplish some financial objectives).
We found that very simple and direct risk preference mea-
sures are significant predictors of the investment choices
within a particular context, although these choices might
differ among (be influenced by) the different contexts.
One conclusion is that preferences might be consistently
defined in relation to the particular context.
We believe that our results reflect what would be likely
to occur were these choices being made for real, e.g., in
a session with a sales person or a financial advisor. The
Financial Affordability questionnaire was designed to en-
force the participants to make their decisions in light of
their real financial circumstances.5
3.1 Theoretical accounts
Range-frequency theory (Parducci, 1965, 1995) is consis-
tent with the result in our experiment, which showed that
preferences for saving and risk are very much determined
by the range of offered choice options (in particular, pref-
erences for the £3,000 saving option and 50% risk option
were different in the high and low context conditions).
The success of range-frequency theory in accounting for
our financial prospective relativity results (and also for
choice in gambling, financial, and game theoretic con-
texts as discussed at the beginning) suggests that the men-
tal representation of utility is analogous to the representa-
tion of any other magnitude information, and in particu-
lar like the representation of simple perceptual stimuli, as
discussed earlier. Nonetheless, as we have already noted,
behaviour in our task is by no means entirely driven by
context (i.e., choice behaviour is not completely insen-
sitive to whether the choices are from the low, high, or
full range). In range-frequency theory, this might be cap-
tured, for example, by allowing some prior knowledge
about income, expenditure, or current savings, to deter-
mine the range of considered options.
The predictive power of the simple question measuring
Direct Risk suggests that people are more or less aware
about their risk preferences, but their risk perception is af-
fected by the context. Weber (1997) argues the perceived
risk is different from risk preferences and that people’s
perceptions of risk may be different from any theoret-
ical risk measures. Weber also demonstrates that peo-
ple act on the basis of the perceived risk and that they
could have stable responses to perceived risk within par-
ticular domains (like health, finance, environment, etc.).
In a similar vein, Weber and Milliman (1997) provide
support for the hypothesis that factors that change and
affect choice also affect risk perception and that inher-
ent risk preference may thus be a constant for a given
5We believe that this type of test of context effects could not be done
in more realistic conditions, because no regulating or legislative author-
ity would allow people’s choices of (real) investment products and sav-
ing rates to be manipulated in such a drastic way. Retirement invest-
ment and saving choices can fundamentally affect a person’s quality of
life (during her entire life span) and so ethical considerations preclude
direct experimentation in the context of a real selling process.
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individual. Furthermore, Weber and Milliman suggest
that risk perception may arise from a number of different
concerns like for example the chance of injury or loss,
magnitude and/or probabilities of losses, aspiration lev-
els/disaster levels, controllability, gain/loss balance, dif-
ferent domains (situational differences), and so on.
3.2 Practical applications
The results presented here show that we can increase sav-
ings and risky investment by manipulating the range of
the choice options. This effect could be used to encour-
age people to save more, which is important because cur-
rent saving rates are much less than the necessary level
— the report by Oliver, Wyman and Company (2001) de-
tails the UK savings gap — and at the same time also
to stimulate them to invest at a higher risk in the capi-
tal markets. The rationale behind the second aim is that
by investing at a higher risk people would experience the
least possible decrease in their current consumption, be-
cause higher market risk would bring higher expected re-
turns and therefore would require less income portion to
be saved.
The practical relevance of such results can be utilized
by using such context manipulation methods during real
financial advice, because financial advisers can encour-
age people to behave in a direction that is expected to
maximise their expected welfare. This approach is simi-
lar to the libertatiran paternalism approach proposed by
Thaler and Sunstein (2003), which preserves freedom of
choice, but authorises both private and public institutions
to steer people in directions that will promote their (suit-
ably defined) welfare (and avoid arbitrary or harmful ef-
fects). For example, Thaler and Sunstein suggest that
such institutions could set out arrangements that will pre-
vail (e.g., after starting a new job, automatically being
enrolled in a retirement savings plan) unless people affir-
matively choose otherwise.
Our results also suggest that people have difficulty
making optimal decisions about their financial future, as
demonstrated by other empirical evidence (e.g., Benartzi
& Thaler, 2002). Therefore, the present results are also a
direct test of whether the various documented context ef-
fects could be used (in combination) to produce desirable
social objectives.
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Appendix A: Retirement savings and
investment decisions questionnaire6
Instruction
This is a questionnaire investigating how people make
decisions related to retirement savings and risky invest-
ments. In the various questions you will see figures
showing different retirement incomes (pensions) result-
ing from the various amounts that you decided to save
per year, also from what portion of your savings you de-
cide to invest in High Risk versus Low Risk assets, and
also depending on when you decide to retire. In addi-
tion you will have to decide much your pension can vary
(plus-minus some average). Thus you will have to make
decisions about five different quantities that are related
to your pension provision, and these quantities are the
amount you would like to save, the proportion of your in-
vestment in the High Risk asset and the Low Risk asset
(which is a measure of how much risk you take), your re-
tirement age, your preferred retirement income, and how
much this income can vary (plus-minus some average in-
come). In some questions, you will have to trade-off be-
tween two or three of these variables at the same time like
for example how much to save and how much retirement
income to expect. There are five questions asking you to
choose different amounts to save per year, and five ques-
tions asking you to choose different levels of investment
risk. Note that all figures shown are in today’s money
terms (i.e. after taking out the effects of inflation).
Most people in United Kingdom are underprovided
(don’t save enough for pension) and we research what
kind of pension top-up product you might find attractive
(in addition to the social security scheme or other pension
6Each question was presented on a separate page.
scheme). Therefore, assume that the decisions that you
are asked to make are for providing you with an income
in addition to what you already have as a pension scheme.
We are interested to know what you would do if you re-
ally need to make these decisions now; so please try to
answer as you would answer if your financial future RE-
ALLY depends on your answers now. Finally, note that
there are no right and wrong answers and you are free to
choose whatever most suits your preferences. You will
see different financial outcomes that can be realistically
accomplished according to our standard economic model,
and your task is to choose the outcome that is nearest to
your subjective preferences. You will be shown prede-
fined ranges of possible answers for your financial deci-
sions, but if you find them unsatisfactory then feel free to
indicate values outside these ranges.
Please use the provided answer sheet to write down
your answers. The answer options are presented in a table
format after each question, and you need to write down
one of the offered amounts for saving or investment risk,
which are always presented in the first column of each ta-
ble. All numbers express annual figures (i.e., how much
you save, invest and receive as a retirement income per
year). Please try to make your decisions as you would
do if your financial future REALLY depends on your an-
swers now. Therefore please make a good effort to read
the questions very carefully and think trough the available
choice options (otherwise the results will be random and
useless and we cannot financially afford to run another
study).
Thank you very much for your effort!
The first block of questions is related to your preferred
savings strategy:
(1) Now you have to choose how much to save as a
portion of your income in order to provide yourself with
a retirement income after you retire at 65. Note that the
more you save the greater your income will be after re-
tirement, but of course you will have less money to spend
in the meantime. Realistically, given the costs of living,
which of the following amounts is closets to what you
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(2) You get here a trustworthy financial advice about
how much you can expect to get back as a pension after
you retire at 65 depending on how much you save dur-
ing your working life. The estimated retirement income
in the second column of the table below is based on the
assumption that your savings are invested in a Low Risk
investment asset, which provides interest rate of 1.5% per
year with negligible variability (and thus we can predict
on average how much you are going to get after you re-
tire). Please choose how much to save per year.












(3) Now you need to make choice between investing
different proportions of your current income and retiring
at different age. The estimated average retirement income
is based on the assumption that your savings are invested
in Low Risk asset, which provides interest rate of 1.5%
per year with negligible variability, and therefore we can
predict how much you are going to get as a retirement
income. Please decide how much you would save per
year in the following scenarios (note that later you retire
less you need to save in order to get certain retirement
income):
Save Retirement Retirement












(4) You get here a trustworthy financial advice about
how much you can expect to get back as a pension if you
retire at 65 depending on how much you are saving per
year. In the table below, there is variability of your re-
tirement income because we assume that you invest half
of your savings (50%) in the High Risk asset, and there-
fore your income partially depends on the performance
of the market and the economy in general, which might
vary over time. Of course the precise amount of your
pension is unpredictable, because of variation in invest-
ment performance, but it is very likely (more than 95%
chance) that it will be between (i.e., cannot get below and
above) the minimum and the maximum values indicated
in the table below. For instance, if you save £3000 per
year (see the table below), then it is very likely (95 per-
cent chance) that your annual retirement income will be
more than £6,500 and less than £11,000, and on average
(50 percent chance) you can get more than £9,000. The
table below indicates how much you could save and what
you could expect on average and also minimum and max-
imum values for your retirement income. Please choose
how much to save per year.
Save Retirement income
per year Minimum Average Maximum
500 1,000 1,500 2,000
1,000 2,000 3,000 3,000
1,500 3,500 4,500 5,500
2,000 4,500 6,000 7,500
2,500 5,500 7,500 9,000
3,000 6,500 9,000 11,000
3,500 7,500 10,500 13,000
4,000 9,000 11,500 14,000
4,500 10,000 13,000 16,500
5,000 11,000 14,500 18,500
5,500 12,000 16,000 20,000
(5) Assume that you will retire at 65. Now you need to
choose between saving different proportions of your cur-
rent income and undertaking different investment strate-
gies expressed as the proportion (percentage) of your sav-
ings invested in the High Risk asset, while the rest of
your savings will be automatically invested in the Low
Risk asset. In the table below, the saved amount per
year increase proportionally with the percentage of this
amount invested in the High Risk asset. More investment
in this asset usually offers higher annual investment re-
turns (4.5 %) compared to the Low Risk asset (offering
1.5%). Note however that there is a risk associated with
the market conditions and the companies’ performance
and therefore higher percentage of your income invested
in the High Risk asset will also bring higher variability of
your expected retirement income, i.e. the minimum and
maximum figures will be increasingly lower and higher
respectively. Now please choose how much to save per
year.
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Save Invest in Retirement income
per year High Risk Minimum Average Maximum
500 0 % 1,000 1,000 1,000
1,000 10 % 2,000 2,500 2,500
1,500 20 % 3,500 4,000 4,00
2,000 30 % 4,500 5,500 6,000
2,500 40 % 5,500 7,000 8,500
3,000 50 % 6,500 9,000 11,000
3,500 60 % 7,500 11,000 14,000
4,000 70 % 8,500 13,000 17,500
4,500 80 % 9,500 15,500 21,000
5,000 90 % 10,500 18,000 25,500
5,500 100 % 11,000 21,000 30,500
IMPORTANT!!!
Now find the highest answer value for savings among
the five questions that you just answered (questions 1 to
5) and if this answer is above your current saving rate that
you provided in question 3 in the Affordability Question-
naire, then you have to give up some of your essential or
discretionary spending (again in the Affordability Ques-
tionnaire) in order to provide the additional capital that is
required to cover the difference between your real current
savings rate and this maximum savings rate (answered
here). Please write down your answers back in the Af-
fordability Questionnaire.
The next block of questions is related specifically to
how much you want to save in products varying in the
degree of risk you would like to take.
Risk is expressed here as the percentage of your sav-
ings, which is invested in a High Risk asset, which of-
fers higher average returns of around 4.5% per year, and
therefore will bring higher income on average, but also
carry more risk that will result in higher variability of the
expected retirement income. Variability is the difference
between the minimum and the maximum possible retire-
ment income, and it will be bigger if you invest more into
the High Risk asset as opposed to the Low Risk asset,
which offers interest rate of 1.5% per year and has very
small variability. Therefore in the following questions
when you see certain figures for the allocation of your
savings to the High Risk investment asset, this implies
that the rest of your retirement savings will be invested in
the Low Risk asset.
(6) First you will have to decide about your investment
strategy simply by choosing the relative proportion of in-
vestment into the High Risk asset. Note that the relatively
higher proportion of investment in this asset can be ex-
pected to produce higher returns than low risk asset, but
will also increase the possible variability of the returns.
Now choose what percentage of your savings to invest in
the High Risk asset (which is nearest to your preferred














(7) Now assume that you decided to retire at 65 and
to save £3000 per year in order to provide for your re-
tirement income. The following options offer different
ranges of retirement income depending on the percent-
age of your savings invested in the High Risk asset, and
you can see in the table the effects on the expected aver-
age retirement income and its variability (minimum and
maximum). There is such variability of your expected
retirement income because when you invest in the High
Risk asset your income partially depends on the perfor-
mance of the market and the economy in general, which
might vary over time. Note that the precise amount of
your pension is unpredictable, because of possible varia-
tion in investment performance, but it is very likely (more
than 95% chance) that it will be between (i.e., cannot get
below and above) the minimum and the maximum values
indicated in the table below. For instance, if you invest
50% per year in the High Risk asset (see the table below),
then it is very likely (95 percent chance) that your annual
retirement income will be more than £5,250 and less than
£11,000, and on average (50 percent chance) you can get
more than £9,000. Now please select how much to invest






0 % 6,500 6,500 7,000
10 % 6,250 7,000 7,500
20 % 6,000 7,500 8,500
30 % 5,750 8,000 9,500
40 % 5,500 8,500 10,000
50 % 5,250 9,000 11,000
60 % 5,000 9,500 12,000
70 % 4,750 10,000 13,000
80 % 4,500 10,500 14,000
90 % 4,250 11,000 15,000
100 % 4,000 11,500 16,500
(8) The following options achieve different retirement
incomes by manipulating the percentage of your savings
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investment in the High Risk asset and also the retirement
age, and you need to make a trade-off between these two
variables (increasing investment in the High Risk asset is
related to decreasing retirement age). The level of your
savings contribution is fixed at £3000 per year. Please
select how much you prefer to invest in the High Risk
asset.
Save Retirement Retirement income
per year Age Minimum Average Maximum
0 % 68 9,500 10,000 10,500
10 % 66 7,500 8,000 9,000
20 % 64 6,000 6,500 7,500
30 % 62 4,500 5,500 6,500
40 % 60 3,500 4,500 5,500
50 % 58 3,000 3,500 4,500
60 % 56 2,500 3,000 3,500
70 % 54 2,000 2,500 3,000
80 % 52 1,500 2,000 2,000
90 % 50 1000 1,500 1,500
100 % 48 500 1,000 1,000
(9) Assume that you decided to retire at 65. Now the
options vary depending on the percentage of your savings
invested in the High Risk asset and the saved amount per
year. Note that less you want to invest more you need
to save, and the variability of your expected retirement
income also increases with increasing the percentage of
your investment in the High Risk asset. Select how much
to invest in the High Risk asset.
Invest in Save Retirement income
High Risk per year Minimum Average Maximum
0 % 5,500 12,000 12,500 13,000
10 % 5,000 11,000 12,000 13,000
20 % 4,500 10,000 11,500 12,500
30 % 4,000 9,000 10,500 12,500
40 % 3,500 8,000 10,000 12,000
50 % 3,000 6,500 9,000 11,000
60 % 2,500 5,500 7,500 10,000
70 % 2,000 4,500 6,500 8,500
80 % 1,500 3,000 5,000 7,000
90 % 1,000 2,000 3,500 5,000
100 % 500 1,000 2,000 3,000
(10) Now you have to choose between different lev-
els of retirement income and different variability of this
income. You need to trade-off the two columns of the
table below — the first column indicates the percentage
with which the income will vary around (plus and minus)
the average expected income shown in the second col-
umn. For example, if your average expected income is
£7,000 (see the table below), then 10% variability means
plus-minus £700 (which is 10% out of £700), and then
your minimum possible income will be £6,300 while your
maximum possible will be £7,700. Note that you can get
bigger retirement income, but with a higher variability
(which is because you will need to invest more in the
High Risk asset). Please choose the variability that you
prefer.
% Variability above Retirement












Appendix B: Financial Affordability
Questionnaire
The following questions ask you about various facts and
preferences related to your personal finances. We also
expect you to provide absolute numbers on your income
and expenditure (in pounds). The purpose of this test is
to investigate to what extend your real financial circum-
stances at the moment affect your choices in the saving
and investment experiment that follows. It is essential to
be as accurate and honest as possible. We greatly appre-
ciate your cooperation and we guarantee that the infor-
mation that you provide will remain strictly confidential.
Please answer the following questions:
1. What is your annual income: ____
2. Which of the following statements reflect your fi-
nancial circumstances (circle the appropriate one
and provide the appropriate figures):
a) You spend less than you earn; state by how much:
____
b) You spend exactly the amount that you earn: ____
c) You spend more than you earn (for example by
borrowing or living on credit); state by how much:
____
In order to answer this question try to estimate to
what extent your current annual income is sufficient
to cover your necessities, and in particular try to fig-
ure out by how much your income is sufficient or
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insufficient to cover your annual expenses (for ex-
ample, you could say that you spent around £2000
more than your current salary in order to cover your
necessities).
3. Try to estimate how much you are able to save at
the moment. Please write down here your average
annual savings: ____
4. Here we provide you with a list of various types of
spending and you have to answer how much of your
current annual income is spent on each of these ex-
penditures. There are two types of expenditure ex-
amples – essential (e.g., food and rent) and discre-
tionary (e.g., leisure activities), and you have to give
estimates of your annual spending across these cat-
egories (for example, you can say that you spend
usually £200 on food, £250 on rent, and so on).
a) Essential expenditure
- Food _____
- Rent / Mortgage _____
- Utilities (electricity, gas, heat, light, water) _____
- Car _____
- Other transport (train busses) _____
- Debt repayment _____
- Communications (telephone, etc.) _____
- Childcare and Schooling _____
- Health _____
- Repairs and Maintenance _____
- Other (e.g., health and life insurance, etc.) _____
b) Discretionary expenditure
- Holiday _____
- Entertainment (e.g., cinema) _____
- Sport _____
- Hobbies _____
- Meals and Drinks _____
- Other _____
TOTAL EXPENDITURE: _____
5. What is the maximum amount that you would like
to save per year: _____
6. Can you give up some of your discretionary spend-
ing in order to increase your current savings rate if it
is below your preferred maximum amount indicated
in question 5?
YES / NO (circle the appropriate)
In order to answer this question, you need to fo-
cus again on your discretionary spending and es-
timate the degree to which you can readily reallo-
cate money towards a pension. Here we also aim to
test how important and essential some these discre-
tionary expenditures are for you (e.g., some people
might be unwilling to give up certain hobbies, sport
activities, etc.). Note that in the following experi-
ment we will ask you series of questions about your
preferred savings; and if you answer values that are
above your current savings (provided in question 3),
then we will ask you to give up some of your essen-
tial or discretionary spending in order to provide the
additional capital that is required to cover the differ-
ence between your real current savings rate and the
savings rate that you have indicated in some of the
test questions.
Appendix C: Results from the Finan-
cial Affordability Questionnaire
We checked whether the participants were in a position to
afford the saving levels selected in the experiment. None
of the participants had selected inappropriate saving rates
in relation to their income and expenditures. Only one
person decided to give up half of her essential spending
and also discretionary spending in order to provide the
additional capital that is required to cover the difference
between her real savings rate and the maximum savings
rate that she had indicated in the main test. Table C shows
the results.
Appendix D: Measures of risk aver-
sion used in the study
(1) Please indicate here how much risk you are prepared
to take on a scale from 1 (not at all — only sure outcomes)
to 5 (very much):
Answer: ____
(2) How much are you concerned about your financial
future? Indicate on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very
much):
Answer: ____
(3) Are you more or less willing to take risks than the
average person?
Indicate using the following scale:
1 - much less
2 - less
3 - the same as the average
4 - more
5 - much more
Answer: ____
(4) Are you more or less concerned about your financial
future than the average person?
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Indicate using the following scale:
1 - much less
2 - less
3 - the same as the average
4 - more
5 - much more
Answer: ____
(5) Suppose that you are the only income earner in the
family, and you have a good job guaranteed to give you
your current (family) income every year for life. You are
given the opportunity to take a new and equally good job,
with a 50–50 chance it will double your (family) income
and a 50–50 chance that it will cut your (family) income
by a third. Would you take the new job? Answer with
YES or NO here:
Answer: ____
If your answer to this question is “yes,” then answer only
question (a) and if your answer is “no,” then answer only
question (b).
(a) Suppose the chances were 50–50 that it would double
your (family) income, and 50–50 that it would cut it in
half. Would you still take the new job? Answer with
YES or NO here:
Answer: ____
(b) Suppose the chances were 50–50 that it would double
your (family) income and 50–50 that it would cut it by 20
percent. Would you then take the new job? Answer with
YES or NO here:
Answer: ____
Table C: Results from the Financial Affordability Ques-
tionnaire.
Question Mean S. D.
General
Annual income 19,235.5 15,492.6
Spend less than you earn by 3,601.1 3,032.7
Spend exactly the amount you earn 18,658.8 8,729.8
Spend more than you earn by 1,593.8 1,136.4
Current Saving 1,829.3 2,363.2
Essential expenditure
Food 2,147.3 1,905.0
Rent / Mortgage 3,177.0 1,990.6
Utilities (electricity, gas, water, etc.) 659.9 832.4
Car 1,301.5 1,616.8
Other transport (train, busses) 343.6 686.3
Debt repayment 1,021.2 1,234.8
Communications (telephone, etc.) 424.1 300.5
Childcare and Schooling 283.5 747.0
Health 76.3 109.7
Repairs and Maintenance 439.6 542.6
Other (e.g., health, life insurance) 425.0 479.6
Holiday 327.0 392.3
Discretionary expenditure
Entertainment (e.g., cinema) 234.0 356.5
Sport 177.5 222.1
Hobbies 554.7 516.4
Meals and Drinks 663.7 1,351.6
Other 1,249.0 5,816.9
Total Expenditure 13,504.9 1,123.6
Demographics
Desired Saving 3,606.9 3,589.4
Household Income 30,328.4 34,202.2
Give up discretionary spending Yes 54.2%






Time spent managing finances Not at all 13.3%
Occasionally 28.3%
Regularly 35.0%
Often 15.0%
Very often 8.3%
